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THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN WISCONSIN
INTRODUCTION.
The outline given below of the law of evidence in Wisconsin,
although quite comprehensive, is not intended or designed to be
exclusive. It is merely a resum6 of the subject with the inter-
jection of Wisconsin propositions, and is one of the many out-
lines which I have prepared in some twenty odd legal subjects
on the completion of the various courses.
Evidence, it must be remembered, is one of the largest and
most comprehensive studies in the law. Its object, of course, is
to filter the great coagulation of facts which one party or the
other endeavors to get before the jury, and to sift the curdle
from the cream. In this process the judge may be compared to
the strainer. It is for him to determine what evidence is ad-
missible and what is not.
Now it is evident that all the curdle is not waste; nor all the
cream pure. There is some of the mixture that is so intermediate
that it is extremely difficult for the court to determine whether
it should be allowed to pass through his metaphorical sieve, or
reject it. It is at this point that the contest between counsel be-
comes acute and a thorough knowledge of the precise laws of
evidence demanded.
Let us, therefore, approach the all-important question with
caution. Does the fact that certain evidence is absolutely re-
jected mean that the point sought to be proved is unapproach-
able? Precisely not. It simply means that the point or probandum
must be hit by other evidence, evidence that is admissible. Ex-
amples of this proposition are needless, as the point is self-ex-
planatory and plainly conceivable.
We can now proceed to discuss the real rules of evidence, the
strands of the sieve, so to speak; and the first great mass of
rules are those which eliminate certain kinds of evidence and are
known as
THE ELIMINATIVE RULES.
I. Exhibition and view to the jury.
i. There is no rule against the exhibition of the thing itself
in a criminal case.
Herman vs. State, 73 Wis. 248.
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2. A view of the premises by the jury is allowable in a crim-
inal case.
Section 2852.
3. A view is also allowable in a civil case.
Sections 2852 and 4095a.
Moritz vs. Larsen, 70 Wis. 569.
II. Character as evidence.
i. Accused's character as evidence of an act.
A. The prosecution is absolutely prohibited in the first in-
stance from putting up accused's base character to
show he did an act.
B. Accused may offer good character to show he did not
do the act.
C. If the accused does introduce his own supposed good
character, then in rebuttal the prosecution may deny
that good moral character.
D. When the accused's character is admissible it is limited
to that trait which is related to the act charged.
Paulson vs. State, ii Wis. 89.
2. Character as evidence of an act in civil cases.
A. Evidence of general character of the parties to civil
cases, where character is not part of the issue, is inad-
admissible.
Wright vs. McKee, 37 Vt., 161.
But evidence of good character is admissible in assault,
seduction, and kindred cases, the same as in criminal
cases, and under the same rules.
Gough vs. St. John, 16 Wend. 645.
B. Moral character is not admissible in civil cases to show
a party did or did not do an act, but where moral
character is relevant, as in fraud, it is admissible to
show one did or did not do an act.
Ruan vs. Perry, 3 Caines RI2o.
C. Where a negligent act is in issue, character is not ad-
missible. 170
Innes vs. City of Milwaukee, 96 Wis. p. _*9.
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3. Modes of using deceased's character for violence in homi-
cide cases.
A. Character of deceased for violence is used for showing
that he was the aggressor, and state in rebuttal may
show deceased's character for peacefulness.
B_ Character of deceased is admissible to show that de-
fendant. believed self-defense was necessary; and de-
fendant need not show knowledge of deceased's repu-
tation.'
Bowles vs. State, 28 N. E. 115.
4. Character as an issue in civil cases.
A. Where character is a. part of issue under the pleadings
and not evidential of an act, it may be given in evi-
dence.
Bofard vs. McLany, i Nott. & McC. 268.
III. Conduct as evidence.
i. Conduct as evidence of accused's moral character.
A. Where accused's character is admissible in a criminal
case it can never be evidenced by specific acts of mis-
conduct, but only by general reputation.
Paulson vs. State, 118 Wis. 89.
2. Conduct as evidence of accused's intent, knowledge, motive.
A. Misconduct of accused may be used to show motive,
knowledge, or intent.
Kollock vs. State, 88 Wis. 663.
NOTE - Sentence increase statutes:
Sections 4736,37,38,38m.
3. Conduct as evidence of character in other cases.
A. Where character is in issue in civil cases, it may be
evidenced by specific acts of misconduct.
4. Conduct as evidence of knowledge, intent, plan, habit, etc.,
in civil cases.
A. In a civil case a party's particular act may be shown in
negligence cases to prove master's negligence in retain-
ing a servant, and in general to charge with notice.
Morrow vs. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 71 Minn. 326.
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B. Other instances of the defective operation of a machine
or defective or dangerous condition of a place are in-
admissible in this state, except to show notice.
Phillips vs Town of Willow, 7o Wis. 6.
IV. Qualifications of witnesses.
i. Mental capacity and moral incapacity.
A. Formerly insanity absolutely disqualified a proposed
witness. Now it merely disqualifies a witness on the
insane delusion it affects.
Section 4085.
Worthington vs. Mercer, 96 Ala., 31o.
B. No specific age absolutely disqualifies a witness, and
it is a question for the court.
Section 4085.
C.'A criminal record does not disqualify a witness, but
may be used to affect his credibility.
Section 4o73.
2. Emotional incapacity.
A. Interest in the cause does not disqualify a witness with
the exception of the so-called survivor statutes.
Sections 4o68, 4070.
B. A husband or wife may testify for or against each
other, unless such communication is privileged.
Section 4072.
3. Subjects of witness' qualifications.
A. All the qualifications of the ordinary witness are pre-
sumed.
B. The qualifications of an expert witness must always be
shown.
An expert is a witness who possesses already the
special experience required to testify on a subject re-
quiring special experience.
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4. Assuming capacity, witness must have exercised senses in
that
A. They must have observed.
a. In general a witness swears only to what has fallen
under his senses.
b. But, handwriting can be testified to in the follow-
mng ways:
(I) Having seen him write the very paper in dis-
pute. (Observation.)
(II) By having seen him write some other docu-
ment.
(III) Didn't see him write, but received a letter
from him which was acted on. (Exception
to observation rule.)
Daniels vs. Foster, 26 Wis. 686.
(IV) Handwriting expert. (Exception.) Here the
type of writing is shown by a witness and the
comparison made by the expert.
The questions to be put to the expert fol-
low:
"Have you a type of - in your mind?
"Assuming specimens are written by
now, is the type the same on this paper?"
B. They must recollect.
a. Communicate answers on question being put.
b. Present recollection revived- a witness can re-
fresh his memory at the discretion of the judge by
using any document.
Davis vs. Field, 56 Vt. 426.
c. Past recollection recorded- when a witness de-
sires to read from a document recording a recollec-
tion he cannot revive, the document must have been
written-
(I) When he had a recollection.
(II) Recorded while it was fresh.
(III) But one need not have made document if
verified by him.
Acklen's Executor vs. Hickman, 63 Ala.
494-
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
C. They must narrate what they recollect.
a. Leading questions are not allowable on direct ex-
amination, but only on cross-examination, with the
following exceptions:
(I) In introductory testimony.
(II) If witness is unwilling to testify, court in its
discretion may allow cross-examiation.
Section 4068.
(III) If memory is exhausted and you would
stimulate such memory.
Misleading questions -are never allowed.
b. A photograph, to be admissible, must be verified by
someone testifying either
(I) That he has seen the original and it is the
same.
Hibbe vs. Maple Creek, iI Wis. 668.
(II) Or, if no one has seen the original, as an
X-ray photo, then the process must be veri-
fied as a correct one.
Mauch vs. Hartford, 112 Wis. 4o.
c. Opinion rule.- As a witness can only tell what he
saw or heard, and not give his inferences by the
general rule, yet there are the exceptions:
(I) That a lay witness can give his inference
when he could not reproduce all the data, mak-
ing the jury capable of drawing inferences, as
saying one is drunk or insane.
(II) An expert witness can always draw in-
ferences.
Baxter vs. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co.,
104 Wis. 307.
RULES O THUMB.
A lay witness can't give opinion as to
sanity in Wisconsin.
Boorman vs. Northwestern Mut. Relief
Co., 90 Wis. 144.
A lay witness can't give opinion as to
safety of a place.
Crawford vs. Christian, 102 Wis. 51.
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A lay witness cannot give his opinion as
to quality of work done.
Palmer vs. Goldberg, 128 Wis. io3.
(III) Opinion to character.
(i) In Wisconsin, probably, opinion as to de-
fendant's character is not admissible.
(2) A witness may testify as to his opinion of
a witness' character if in the following
form:
I. "Do you know his reputation for
veracity? Is it good or bad ?"
2. "Knowing that reputation, would you
believe'him under oath?"
(IV) Opinion to handwriting.
(i) Authorship of handwriting may be evi-
denced by showing alleged specimens of
the party's handwriting to a witness for
comparison when proved to satisfaction
of the court to be genuine, and such evi-
dence may be submitted to the jury.
Section 4189a.
(2) Such comparison is for the expert wit-
ness.
Colbert vs. State, 125 Wis. 434.
(V) The Hypothetical Question.
(i) A hypothetical form of question need not
be used as a basis for an expert witness
who draws his opinion from personal ob-
servation.
Estate of Bean, 159 Wis. 67.
(2) A hypothetical question is insufficient
where its basis is not proved.
Estate of Bean, 159 Wis. 67.
(3) A hypothetical question must contain all
material, uncontroverted evidence.
Pfeiffer vs. Radke, 144 Wis. 430.
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V. Impeachment of witnesses.
i. General traits of character.
A. The moral character of a witness is presumed at first,
but he may be impeached for want of veracity.
Wilson vs. Young, 31 Wis. 574.
B. When accused becomes a witness, he can only be im-
peached as such.
Wilson vs. State, 3 Wis. 798.
C. A witness' mental defects are not admissible against
him.
Alleman vs. Stepp, 52 Ia., 626.
2. Specific conduct.
A. You cannot call another witness to prove first witness
told a lie on a former occasion not relevant to the issue.
Parroski vs. Goldberg, 80 Wis. 339.
B. A conviction of any kind of crime may be used to im-
peach a witness.
Section 4073.
Kock vs. State, 126 Wis. 470.
C. On cross-examination of a witness, questions can be
put to him of his particular acts of misconduct, at the
discretion of the court.
Buel vs. State, 104 Wis. 132.
But note-Meehan vs. State, I19 Wis. 621.
D. A witness may be asked whether he has been arrested
for an offense, if followed by proof of convictipn for it.
State vs. Thornton, 117 Wis. 338.
3. Contradiction and self-contradiction.
A. A witness may be contradicted by another witness or
his own self-contradiction for purpose of discrediting
him on facts relevant to the case that would have been
admissible for another cause, irrespective of contradic-
tion or self-contradiction.
Hinton vs. Cream City R. R. Co., 65 Wis. 323.
B. But in discrediting a witness by his own self-contra-
diction or by other expressions, he must first be warned
by being asked whether he made the expression, men-
tioning time, place, and person to whom made.
Parroski vs. Goldberg, 80 Wis. 339.
This warning may be dispensed with in case of
deposition.
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4. Who may be impeached.
A. One's own witness may never be discredited by bad
moral character.
B. One's own witness may never be discredited by con-
tradiction from another, unless relevant to the case,
and the witness could have testified in any event.
C. Nor can one's own witness be discredited by self-con-
tradiction, unless under above circumstances.
D. Under the above rules, if plaintiff calls a witness and
tries to impeach him, he is his witness; while if de-
fendant tries, after first calling him as his witness, he
is his own witness.
Subject to Section 4o68.
VI. Corroboration of witness.
i. A witness' credit may be corroborated by his good moral
character only after it has been discredited.
Ledens vs. Schumers, 12 Ill. 263.
2. A witness' credit may be corroborated by his consistent
statements made out of court only where they assist in
showing his testimony was not of recent contrivance.
Hewitt vs. Corey, 150 Mass. 445.
VII. Party's admissions and confessions.
i. In general.
A. Extra judicial admissions are not conclusive on the
party making them.
Emery vs. State, IOI Wis. 627.
B. A real stipulation cannot be contradicted.
Reha vs. Pelnar, 86 Wis. 408.
2. Third Person's admissions.
A. An admission by a party having a similar interest is
not admissible.
Chapman vs. C. & N. W. Ry. Co., 26 Wis. 295.
B. The admissions by a predecessor in title against his
title is not evidence against him.
Leek vs. Mulholland, 48 Wis. 413.
C. An agent's admissions are receivable against his prin-
cipal when made within the scope of his authority.
Davis vs. Henderson, 20 Wis. 520.
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3. Implied admissions.
A. From conduct.
a. An inference arises against the holder of a deed if
it is in his possession or under his control and he
refuses to deliver it to the other party on due notice.
b. No inference can be drawn from evidence that re-
pairs were made after an injury due to supposed
negligence of defendant.
Lind vs. Uniform S. & P. Co., I4O Wis.
183.
c. No inference can be drawn in failing to produce a
witness who might testify favorably.
d. No inference can be drawn because of violation of
safety regulation of company.
Sparks vs. Wis. Cent. Ry. Co., 139 Wis.
lo8.
B. From silence.
a. Inferences are admissible from a party's silence in
not answering a letter of claim by the opponent.
b. The fact that things are said orally in ones presence
by the opponent does not create an inference, tho
not denied.
Hinton vs. Wells, 45 Wis. 268.
4. Admissions in litigation.
A. In Wisconsin a compromise offer which is real or
hypothetical permits no inference to be drawn from it.
John DeWolf Co. vs. Harvey, 161 Wis. 535.
Taylor vs. Tigerton Lum. Co., 134 Wis. 24.
B. An inference is admissible from a party's pleadings in
the same or another suit, and such admission is con-
clusive.
Schoeth vs. Drake, 139 Wis. 18.
Denton vs. White, 26 Wis. 679.
5. Confessions.
A. A confession, if made without threat or promise of
favor, is admissible even tho made while under arrest.
Hints vs. State, 125 Wis. 405.
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Under the Federal Rule a confession made to a
police officer is not admissible, as it is presumed it was
secured by threat or favor.
Broni vs. U. S., 168 U. S. 532.
B. A confession made by a witness under oath is ad-
admissible.
C. The above confession rules are not applicable to a
statement denying guilt.
LEONARD P. BAUMBIATT.
EDITOR'S NOTE-This is to be continued in the next issue.
